OctetView
0x00000…00100 (0, 0, 0) Sector 00844130303834 ┆ A0084A ┆
0x00100…00200 (0, 0, 1) Sector 00000000000000 ┆ ┆
0x00200…00300 (0, 0, 2) Sector ff00e0ffffffff ┆ ` || @ ┆
0x00300…00306 (0, 0, 3) WangDocument {d00=0x13, d01=0x40, d02=0x41, ptr=(64,0, 8), d05=0x00}
0x00306…0030c WangDocument {d00=0x13, d01=0x41, d02=0x41, ptr=(32,0, 0), d05=0x00}
0x0030c…00312 WangDocument {d00=0x13, d01=0x42, d02=0x41, ptr=(54,0, 0), d05=0x00}
0x00312…00318 WangDocument {d00=0x13, d01=0x43, d02=0x41, ptr=(63,0, 8), d05=0x00}
0x00318…00320 13 43 41 43 08 00 00 00 ┆ CAC ┆
0x00320…00340 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ┆ ┆
[…0x5…]
0x003e0…00400 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 18 ┆ ┆
0x00400…00500 (0, 0, 4) Sector 00000000000000 ┆ ┆
0x00500…00600 (0, 0, 5) Sector 00844130303834 ┆ A0084A ┆
0x00600…00700 (0, 0, 6) Sector 421c402600415b ┆B @& A[' & X% % PO P ; CA C f x f V W O : 1343A f L < {C < { ; 6 ` c 1340A1341A1343A ┆
0x00700…00800 (0, 0, 7) Sector 00000000000000 ┆ ┆
[…0x8…]
0x01000…01100 (1, 0, 0) WangDocumentBody
[…0x2…]
0x01300…01400 (1, 0, 3) Sector 01041700130841 ┆ A Oct. 8, 1981 .M )> I> I:]=~ BC.MP- R5.> IM)-:^=~ BC.C~.M_* RM.> I:^=~ B[.Mr)Cp.:]=~ Bp.MP- Rm.> IM)-MI,:^=~ B~.> IMB'IM2& 9x2"<!Z="(=^#Vk"$<:]=2#<:^=~ J6.! <6 M8) R6.> I! <6 M8)I!h=6 ! =6 M")IM"):g=~ J /:h=2>=M?.Mj': < Zn.C / E*:=k 0wM% !;=4C┆
0x01400…01500 (1, 0, 4) Sector 0105ff00130841 ┆ A 1 3.3 Telecommunications Recently Christian Rovsing's maintenance sub-contractor CNCP Telecommunications, responded to an Air Canada Request for Information (RFI). Their response to┆
0x01500…01600 (1, 0, 5) Sector 0106ff00130841 ┆ A the RFI dated December 15, 1980 is included in its entirety in this proposal as ANNEX E. Christian Rovsing feels this document provides Air Canada with sufficient details on CNCP's existing network services and offerings, as well as their plans f┆
0x01600…01700 (1, 0, 6) Sector 00006b00130841 ┆ k Aor the future, to enable Air Canada to plan for a total solution to their communication requirements.:^=~ J 1!"<6;!#<6 !&<6 ! "$<! <6 {M;(s! 9"c=! "(= Z=q#p!"<6 !&<6 ! "$<!#<6 ! <6 {M)(sC I! <6 ! "(= <q#p!"<6 !#<6 ! "$<!&<6$`i6 {M)(sM &M7 ┆
0x01700…01800 (1, 0, 7) Sector 00000000000000 ┆ ┆
0x01800…01900 (1, 0, 8) WangDocumentBody
[…0xd5…]
0x0ee00…0ef00 (14, 0, 14) Sector 0e0f4d00134041 ┆ M @A5.3.8.1 Configuration 5.3.8.2 Equipment List 5.3.9 Standard Expansion sM & E 0= u M% :^=~ Bl1{M40sI:^=~ J 1!"<6;!#<6 !&<6 ! "$<! <6 {M;(s! 9"c=! "(= Z=q#p!"<6 !&<6 ! "$<!#<6 ! <6 {M)(sC I! <6 ! "(= <q#p!"<6 !#<6 ! "$<!&<6$`i6 {M)(sM &M7 ┆
0x0ef00…0f000 (14, 0, 15) Sector 0e00ff00134041 ┆ @A 1 5.4 Electrical Interfaces 5.4.1 Host Interfaces 5.4.1.1 UNIVAC Interface 5.4.1.2 Other Host Interfaces 5.4.2 Communication Interfaces 5.4.2.1 X20 bis, X21 bis, V24 5.4.2.2 X21 ┆
0x0f000…0f100 (15, 0, 0) WangDocumentBody
[…0x5…]
0x0f600…0f700 (15, 0, 6) Sector 00000600134141 ┆ AAnd control of messages. It also creates and dismantles virtual calls. The communication as well as the network interfaces are shown in fig. III 6.5-4. s the software located in each node of the Packet Switching Network. The purpose of the Transm┆
0x0f700…0f800 (15, 0, 7) Sector 0e08ff00130941 ┆ A A common security policy and hiearachical resource management strategy is used by the Kernel, the FMS and the TMS. These strategies have been designed with the objective of allowing multiple concurrent higher level operating systems to coexist in┆
0x0f800…0f900 (15, 0, 8) WangDocumentBody
[…0x107…]
0x20000…20100 (32, 0, 0) WangDocumentHead {hdr=WangSectHead {next=(32,0, 1), len=0xff, h3=41134141}, f00=»1341A «, f01=»Air Canada Proposal «, f02=» «, f03=» «, f04=»Doc.III Chap. 6.1-65 «, f05=08-10-81 15:19, f06=» «, f07=»05 «, f08=» 371 «, f09=27-04-82 11:55, f10=» «, f11=»02 «, f12=» 61 «, f13=26-04-82 15:40, f14=29-04-82 10:21, f15=»0084A «, f16=» 55 «, f17=» «, f18=»19 «, f19=» 884 «, f20=» 506 «, f21=» «, f22=» «, f99=040060000110066610110180aaca15050000000000000037031601df}
0x20100…20200 (32, 0, 1) WangDocumentBody
[…0x48…]
0x24a00…24b00 (36, 0, 10) Sector 240bff00134341 ┆$ CAe and repair. The markings will sustain normal cleaning agents, and will therefore still be legible after installation and testing has been effected. Component marking will consist of the component manufacturers' standard marking. 8.4.9 Changea┆
0x24b00…24c00 (36, 0, 11) Sector 240cbf00134341 ┆$ ? CAble Markings The different systems and subsystems will be individually marked with the system nomenclature and designation to facilitate identification during maintenance and repair.nd racks and integrate one side of the system while the other is┆
0x24c00…24d00 (36, 0, 12) Sector 240dff00134341 ┆$ CA 1 8.4.10 Mechanical Dimensions The standard rack dimensions are: - Height: 2150 mm - Width: 600 mm - Depth: 950 mm The actual system dimensions and lay-out are described in┆
0x24d00…24e00 (36, 0, 13) Sector 240eff00134341 ┆$ CA section 3. 8.4.11 Power Supplies The equipment is as standard designed to be fed from 220V AC source with the following characteristics: Voltage: 220V, +7%, -10% Frequency: 50Hz, +0.5%, -1.0Hz Limits of superimposed interference voltage w┆
0x24e00…24f00 (36, 0, 14) Sector 240f2b00134341 ┆$ + CAill be as described earlier in 8.3. lementing the modules' function. 8.4.5 System Life Time As mentioned above, the modules in the system are designed to be compatible with a set of interface specifications which covers mechanical, electrical, a┆
0x24f00…25000 (36, 0, 15) Sector 00000600134341 ┆ CAnd functional interfaces thereby allowing the modules to be changed with modules of a new generation without adjustments and without affecting the remaining part of the system soft- or hardware. By using this approach in the complete hardware, cen┆
0x25000…25100 (37, 0, 0) WangDocumentBody
[…0x10f…]
0x36000…36100 (54, 0, 0) WangDocumentHead {hdr=WangSectHead {next=(54,0, 1), len=0xff, h3=41134241}, f00=»1342A «, f01=»Air Canada Proposal «, f02=» «, f03=» «, f04=»Doc.III Chapter 6.6 «, f05=08-10-81 15:23, f06=» «, f07=»03 «, f08=» 189 «, f09= - - : , f10=» «, f11=» «, f12=» «, f13= - - : , f14=21-04-82 10:16, f15=»0084A «, f16=» 66 «, f17=» «, f18=»03 «, f19=» 1252 «, f20=» 189 «, f21=» «, f22=» «, f99=020010000110066610a10a80aaca15050000000000000037034601df}
0x36100…36200 (54, 0, 1) WangDocumentBody
[…0x96…]
0x3f800…3f900 (63, 0, 8) WangDocumentHead {hdr=WangSectHead {next=(63,0, 9), len=0xff, h3=41134341}, f00=»1343A «, f01=»Air Canada Proposal «, f02=» «, f03=» «, f04=»Doc.III Chapter 7+8 «, f05=08-10-81 15:27, f06=» «, f07=»08 «, f08=» 266 «, f09=14-04-82 13:46, f10=» «, f11=»00 «, f12=» 4 «, f13=13-11-81 09:50, f14=29-04-82 10:22, f15=»0084A «, f16=» 47 «, f17=» «, f18=»11 «, f19=» 516 «, f20=» 390 «, f21=» «, f22=» 0 «, f99=430043000110066610110180aaca1505000000000000003703b200df}
0x3f900…3fa00 (63, 0, 9) WangDocumentBody
[…0xe…]
0x40800…40900 (64, 0, 8) WangDocumentHead {hdr=WangSectHead {next=(64,0, 9), len=0xff, h3=41134041}, f00=»1340A «, f01=»Air Canada Proposal «, f02=» «, f03=» «, f04=»Doc. III Chapter 5. «, f05=08-10-81 15:15, f06=» «, f07=»06 «, f08=» 439 «, f09=15-04-82 15:15, f10=» «, f11=»01 «, f12=» 4 «, f13=08-01-82 10:21, f14=29-04-82 10:21, f15=»0084A «, f16=» 94 «, f17=» 1 «, f18=»14 «, f19=» 524 «, f20=» 3933 «, f21=» «, f22=» p «, f99=970097000110066610110180aaca1505000000000000003703e300df}
0x40900…40a00 (64, 0, 9) WangDocumentBody
[…0x6…]
0x41000…41100 (65, 0, 0) Sector 4101a200134341 ┆A " CA 1 Node Channel Unit # 2 Node Channel Unit # 3 sed equipment provides the high degree of reliability required. The system reliability char┆
0x41100…41200 (65, 0, 1) Sector 41029600134341 ┆A CA 1 EMH Channel Unit GTY Channel Unit er. The system models are partitioned into modular units and system elements that reflect the redundancy ┆
0x41200…41300 (65, 0, 2) Sector 41038600134341 ┆A CA 1 NCC Channel Unit sed in the calculations were obtained from experience with similar equipment on the NICS-TARE,FIKS and CAMPS programmes. ┆
0x41300…41400 (65, 0, 3) Sector 41048a00134341 ┆A CA 1 FEP Channel Unit functions apportioned so that system elements can have only two states - operable or failed. System elements are ess┆
0x41400…41500 (65, 0, 4) Sector 4105c600134341 ┆A F CA 1 7.2.3 Node Reliability Shown in the figure below is the Node Reliability model ice. Maintenance and reconfiguration is possible without ┆
0x41500…41600 (65, 0, 5) Sector 4106c200134341 ┆A B CA 1 7.2.4 EMH Reliability In the figure below the reliability for the EMH is shown. minal in the backbone network. The access to the NMH is contr┆
0x41600…41700 (65, 0, 6) Sector 4107d300134341 ┆A S CA 1 7.2.5 GTW Reliability In the figure below the reliability for the Gateway Processor is shown. btained from experience from previous progra┆
0x41700…41800 (65, 0, 7) Sector 4008cd00134341 ┆@ M CA 1 7.2.6 Site Reliability In the figures below the reliability models for the sites are shown. on the following pages. ay be customised to the ac┆
0x41800…41900 (65, 0, 8) Sector 4109ff00134341 ┆A CA 1 7.2.1 Reliability Models for PU's The relaibility models MTBF and availability predictions for the Processing Units are shown in the figure below: NODE PROCESSOR┆
0x41900…41a00 (65, 0, 9) Sector 410a3200134341 ┆A 2 CA UNIT Fig.III 7.2.1-1 ices is lower than that of the associated CR80 device controllers. This applies equally well to communication lines where modems are used as part of the transmission media. Thus, the peripheral devices , m┆
0x41a00…41b00 (65, 0, 10) Sector 410b9a00134341 ┆A CA 1 NMH PROCESSOR UNIT Fig.III 7.2.1-2 ion lines, the CR80 CU's utilises n out of n+1 LTU's and n LIA-S's to achieve the highest possible av┆
0x41b00…41c00 (65, 0, 11) Sector 410ca400134341 ┆A $ CA 1 NCC & GATEWAY PROCESSOR UNIT Fig. III 7.2.1-3 e appropriate LIA-S. To assure this very highly reliable product, several criterias were ┆
0x41c00…41d00 (65, 0, 12) Sector 410d9b00134341 ┆A CA 1 EMH PROCESSOR UNIT Fig. III 7.2.1-4 similar. jM (*(=~ R;/!/=6nM (*(=~ RM/!/=6iM (*(=~ R`/!/=6WM (*(=~ Rt/!/=6lM (*(=~ R ┆
0x41d00…41e00 (65, 0, 13) Sector 410eae00134341 ┆A . CA 1 FEP PROCESSOR UNIT (MAX CONFIGURATION) Fig. III 7.2.1-5 erating specifications, which greatly enhance the reliability and reduce the sens┆
0x41e00…41f00 (65, 0, 14) Sector 410fff00134341 ┆A CA 1 7.2.2 Reliability Models for CU's The reliability models, MTBF and availability for the channel units are shown in the figures below. Node Channel Unit # 1 ┆
0x41f00…42000 (65, 0, 15) Sector 41001700134341 ┆A CA ebug and trouble shooting methods, which reduce the repair time. A high quality production line, which includes high quality soldering, inspection, burn-in and an extensive automatic functional test. 7.2 RELIABILITY MODELS AND ┆
0x42000…42100 (66, 0, 0) Sector 4201ff00134341 ┆B CABLOCK DIAGRAMS The computer system is partitioned into system elements and the models used for relaibility and availabilty predictions show how the proposed equipment provides the high degree of reliability required. The system reliability char┆
0x42100…42200 (66, 0, 1) Sector 4202ff00134341 ┆B CAacteristics for the system are stated in numerical terms by mathematical models; the supporting detailed predictions are presented in this chapter. The system models are partitioned into modular units and system elements that reflect the redundancy ┆
0x42200…42300 (66, 0, 2) Sector 4203ff00134341 ┆B CAof the configuration; it accounts for all interconnections and switching points. The MTBF and MTTR for the individual elements used in the calculations were obtained from experience with similar equipment on the NICS-TARE,FIKS and CAMPS programmes. ┆
0x42300…42400 (66, 0, 3) Sector 4204ff00134341 ┆B CAThe figures quoted on peripheral equipment are based on data supplied by the manufacturers. The equipment has been partitioned and functions apportioned so that system elements can have only two states - operable or failed. System elements are ess┆
0x42400…42500 (66, 0, 4) Sector 4205ff00134341 ┆B CAentially stand-alone and free of chain failures. Careful attention has been paid in the design to eliminate series risk elements. Redundants units are repairable without interruption of service. Maintenance and reconfiguration is possible without ┆
0x42500…42600 (66, 0, 5) Sector 42062600134341 ┆B & CAcompromising system performance.nd repair time MTTR. the standard software utility package. erminal Protocol" described in section 6.6. Thus the NMH is able to serve any user at any terminal in the backbone network. The access to the NMH is contr┆
0x42600…42700 (66, 0, 6) Sector 4207ff00134341 ┆B CA 1 The primary source selected for authenticated relaibility data and predictions is the MIL-HDBK-217. The failure rate data are primarily obtained from experience from previous progra┆
0x42700…42800 (66, 0, 7) Sector 4108e500134341 ┆A e CAmmes and continuously revised as part of the maintenance programme on concurrent programmes. The relialibility models which apply to the proposed configurations are identified in the figures shown on the following pages. ay be customised to the ac┆
0x42800…42900 (66, 0, 8) Sector 4209ff00134341 ┆B CAtual availability requirements. The CR80 fault tolerant computers are designed to avoid a single point errors of all critical system elements by provision of redundancy paths,processor capabilities and power supplies. The architecture reflects the┆
0x42900…42a00 (66, 0, 9) Sector 420aff00134341 ┆B CA fact that the reliability of peripheral devices is lower than that of the associated CR80 device controllers. This applies equally well to communication lines where modems are used as part of the transmission media. Thus, the peripheral devices , m┆
0x42a00…42b00 (66, 0, 10) Sector 420bff00134341 ┆B CAodems, communication lines, etc impact the system availability much more than the corresponding device controllers. In connection with communication lines, the CR80 CU's utilises n out of n+1 LTU's and n LIA-S's to achieve the highest possible av┆
0x42b00…42c00 (66, 0, 11) Sector 420cff00134341 ┆B CAailability to individual subscribers. The functions of a failed LTU can automatically be taken over by the spare LTU, electronically controlled by enabling the appropriate LIA-S. To assure this very highly reliable product, several criterias were ┆
0x42c00…42d00 (66, 0, 12) Sector 420da500134341 ┆B % CAalso introduced on the module level: An extensive use of hi-rel, mil-spec components, ICs are tested to the requirements of MIL-STD 883 level B or similar. jM (*(=~ R;/!/=6nM (*(=~ RM/!/=6iM (*(=~ R`/!/=6WM (*(=~ Rt/!/=6lM (*(=~ R ┆
0x42d00…42e00 (66, 0, 13) Sector 420eff00134341 ┆B CA 1 All hardware is designed in accordance with the general CR80 H/W design principles. These include derating specifications, which greatly enhance the reliability and reduce the sens┆
0x42e00…42f00 (66, 0, 14) Sector 420fff00134341 ┆B CAibility to parameter variations. Critical modules feature a Built-In(BIT) capability as well as a display of the main states of the internal process by Light Emitting Diodes on the module front plate. This greatly improves module maintainability,┆
0x42f00…43000 (66, 0, 15) Sector 4200ff00134341 ┆B CA as it provides debug and trouble shooting methods, which reduce the repair time. A high quality production line, which includes high quality soldering, inspection, burn-in and an extensive automatic functional test. 7.2 RELIABILITY MODELS AND ┆
0x43000…43100 (67, 0, 0) Sector 4301ff00134341 ┆C CAments automatically substitute each other in case of failure. Overall system availability has been calculated. The high system availability has been achieved by use of highly reliable modules, redundant processor units and line termination units, ┆
0x43100…43200 (67, 0, 1) Sector 4302ff00134341 ┆C CAand automatic reconfiguration facilities. Care has been taken to ensure that single point errors do not cause total system failure. The reliability criteria imposed on the computer systems has been evaluated and the proposed hardware/software oper┆
0x43200…43300 (67, 0, 2) Sector 4303ff00134341 ┆C CAational system analysed to determine the degree of availability and data integrity provided. In this chapter reliability is stated in numerical terms and the detailed predictions derived from mathematical models presented. The availability predict┆
0x43300…43400 (67, 0, 3) Sector 4304ff00134341 ┆C CAions are made in accordance with system reliability models and block daiagrams corresponding to the proposed configuration. This procedure involves the use of module level and processor unit level failure rates, or MTBF, (mean time between failure) ┆
0x43400…43500 (67, 0, 4) Sector 4305ff00134341 ┆C CAans repair times or MTTR, (mean time to repair); these factors are used in conjunction with a realistic modelling of the configuration to arrive at system level MTBF and availability. Tabulated results of the analysis are presented including the r┆
0x43500…43600 (67, 0, 5) Sector 43063b00134341 ┆C ; CAeliabilty factors: system MTBF and repair time MTTR. the standard software utility package. erminal Protocol" described in section 6.6. Thus the NMH is able to serve any user at any terminal in the backbone network. The access to the NMH is contr┆
0x43600…43700 (67, 0, 6) Sector 4307ff00134341 ┆C CA 1 The basic elements of the proposed system architecture are constituted by standard CR80 units. Reliabilty and maintainability engineering was significant factor in guiding the devel┆
0x43700…43800 (67, 0, 7) Sector 4208ff00134341 ┆B CAopment of the CR80. The CR80 architecture is designed with a capability to achieve a highly reliable computer system in a cost-effective way. It provides a reliable set of services to the users of the system, because it may be customised to the ac┆
0x43800…43900 (67, 0, 8) WangDocumentHead {hdr=WangSectHead {next=(67,0, 9), len=0xff, h3=41134341}, f00=»1343A «, f01=»Air Canada Proposal «, f02=» «, f03=» «, f04=»Doc.III Chapter 7+8 «, f05=08-10-81 15:27, f06=» «, f07=»03 «, f08=» 159 «, f09= - - : , f10=» «, f11=» «, f12=» «, f13= - - : , f14=08-10-81 16:19, f15=»0084A «, f16=» 47 «, f17=» «, f18=»03 «, f19=» 588 «, f20=» 159 «, f21=» «, f22=» «, f99=020010000110066610a10a80aaca1505000000000000003703b000df}
0x43900…43a00 (67, 0, 9) Sector 430a2f00134341 ┆C / CA C C C B B A A A A A A A A A A A A A A @ @ @ @ @ @ ? ? > > = = = = = = < < < ; ; ; ; & % % % $ okument nr: Dokumentnavn: Operat]r: Forfatter: Kommentarer: STATISTIK AKTIVITET DATO TID ANV.TID ANSLAG Oprettet / / : : ┆
0x43a00…43b00 (67, 0, 10) Sector 430bff00134341 ┆C CA 1 LIST OF CONTENTS 7. RMA 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Reliability Models and Block Diagrams 7.2.1 Reliability Models fo PU's 7.2.2 Reliability Models for CU's 7.2.3 Node Reliability 7.2.┆
0x43b00…43c00 (67, 0, 11) Sector 430cff00134341 ┆C CA4 EMH Reliability 7.2.5 GTW Reliability 7.2.6 Site Reliability 7.2.7 NCC Subsystem 7.2.8 Network Availability 7.3 Equipment Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 7.4 Equipment Maintainability (MTTR) 7.5 RMA Analysis 7.5.1 RMA Analysis for Communicati┆
0x43c00…43d00 (67, 0, 12) Sector 430d0f00134341 ┆C CAon Lines e= R+/:]=2#<! <6 M1' R+/M )M2&MP'I:^=~ B;/IMC'!e=6 *(=~ RN/C}/:]=2#<:b= Rc/! <6 Ch/! <6 M)(:^=~ Bt/I:\=2#<C /:]=2#<! <6 M)(I:g=~ J /Mj'! "(=~ R*/!/=6jM (*(=~ R;/!/=6nM (*(=~ RM/!/=6iM (*(=~ R`/!/=6WM (*(=~ Rt/!/=6lM (*(=~ R ┆
0x43d00…43e00 (67, 0, 13) Sector 430eff00134341 ┆C CA 1 7 RELIABILITY,MAINTAINABILITY AND AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS This chapter provides the detailed analysis of the reliability and maintainability provided by the proposed equipment.┆
0x43e00…43f00 (67, 0, 14) Sector 430fff00134341 ┆C CA Emphasis has been given to include the analysis for the range covered by the proposed system architecture. Furthermore, detailed information with respect to failure rates and repair times is provided for the various components and modules included ┆
0x43f00…44000 (67, 0, 15) Sector 4300ff00134341 ┆C CAin the architecture. 7.1 INTRODUCTION The availablity of the proposed equipment is very high due not only to a high reliability of individual system elments, but not least due to the chosen CR80 computer configuration, where functional like ele┆
0x44000…44100 (68, 0, 0) Sector 00000000000000 ┆ ┆
[…0x8f…]
