DataMuseum.dk

Presents historical artifacts from the history of:

DKUUG/EUUG Conference tapes

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⟦943d62322⟧ TextFile

    Length: 3417 (0xd59)
    Types: TextFile
    Names: »XTRA_CREDIT«

Derivation

└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen
    └─⟦ed5edc051⟧ »./cops/1.02/cops.102.tar« 
└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen
    └─⟦db60b44f1⟧ »./cops/1.02/cops.102.tar.Z« 
        └─⟦ed5edc051⟧ 
            └─⟦this⟧ »cops/XTRA_CREDIT« 

TextFile


  Code credits are where code credits are due.  If I miss anyone, please
forgive (and notify) me!

Gene Spafford -- overall design help.

Robert Baldwin and Steve Romig -- the original kuang package/design, and
the perl rewrite, respectively.

Craig Leres, Jef Poskanzer, Seth Alford, Roger Southwick, Steve Dum,
and Rick Lindsley all get credit for the password guessing program.

Prentiss Riddle -- the suid checker.

Mark Mendel and Jon Zeef -- the crc generator.

  In round III (this patch), Muffy Barkocy and Michelle Crabb both gave me
good ideas to use.  Pete Shipley fixed up some code (is_able) and generally
helped my motivation to get things out the door.  Gandalph suggested ftp.chk,
Jay Batson made me fix root.chk, Shelley Shostak fixed and added features
to pass.chk, and Brian Moore gave me the shell script checking --> SUID
concept.  Jim W Lai pointed out some other pass.chk things (what a buggy
program :-)).  Rob Kolstad told me about some bugs in the ftp checker, and
gently pointed out that some stuff wasn't using the YP passwd files when
they should be, and Jim Ellis helped get this to work on a Cray.  There
are probably more that I've forgotten (sorry, if so!) Thanks, people...

  In round II (the first patch), Mark Plumbly fixed rc.chk so it would
work like I said it would, as well as pointing out a few problems with
the password guesser.

  And of course lots of credit goes to my great Beta-release sweatshop team;
especially Adri Verhoef for tightening up lots of my crummy code (cops,
group.chk, root.chk, is_writable, dev.chk, dir.chk & file.chk among others),
Steve Romig for good ideas _and_ letting me use a system V machine to test
on (how many people do you know that would let you test a security
system on their system with no strings attached!) Jason Levitt, Jim
Kimble, Jim Rowan, Stefan Vorkoetter, Judy Scheltema, Pete Troxell (all
the Sun C2 stuff....), Dennis Conley, and of course John Sechrest.
Tony Petrost pointed out some of my incorrect assumptions and helped
fix cron.chk.  Kudos also to Bruce Spence for giving me some good
implementation ideas at LISA III.

  If strings is not available to you, a version is available on uunet;
also a nifty install program written by Kevin Braunsdorf that can be used
as a super directory/file mode checker/security device might be available
soon in comp.sources.unix (these programs large sizes preculudes their
inclusion in COPS, but I recommend looking into them.)  Both can be gotten
via anonymous ftp.  Strings is in comp.unix.sources directory, install,
should be in j.cc.purdue.edu, methinks.
  Everything else not explicitely mentioned in the COPS.report.ms paper
or here was written by me.  Not mentioned execpt in the source code are
some small changes made by myself to make everything fit in as a cohesive
whole; I tried to make comments in the source code if I changed it (never
to drastic in any case.)

  For a good story on the subject, you might want to read _The Cuckoo's
Egg_, by Clifford Stoll.  This is a true tale of a sysadmin's fight 
against beaurocracy and a system cracker.  Good stuff.

  For a a good read on Unix security in general, look at Dave Curry's now
infamous "white paper", via anon-ftp, SPAM.ITSTD.SRI.COM (128.18.4.3) as
the file "pub/security-doc.tar.Z.  But don't believe him when he says Yellow
Pages is secure.  It's not.  Not much is, these days... good luck, tho!

 -- dan