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Length: 2427 (0x97b) Types: TextFile Names: »miscd.c«
└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen └─⟦62b59102f⟧ »./log_tcp/3.1.tar.Z« └─⟦1de3ed35f⟧ └─⟦this⟧ »log_tcp/miscd.c«
/* * Front end to the ULTRIX miscd service. The front end logs the remote host * name and then invokes the real miscd daemon. Install as "/usr/etc/miscd", * after moving the real miscd daemon to the "/usr/etc/..." directory. * Connections and diagnostics are logged through syslog(3). * * The Ultrix miscd program implements (among others) the systat service, which * pipes the output from who(1) to stdout. This information is potentially * useful to systems crackers. * * Compile with -DHOSTS_ACCESS in order to enable access control. See the * hosts_access(5) manual page for details. * * Compile with -DPARANOID if service should be refused to hosts that pretend * to have someone elses host name. This gives some protection against rsh * and rlogin attacks that involve compromised domain name servers. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) miscd.c 1.2 91/10/02 23:01:43"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/param.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <syslog.h> /* Local stuff. */ #include "log_tcp.h" /* The following specifies where the vendor-provided daemon should go. */ #define REAL_DAEMON "/usr/etc/.../miscd" main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { struct from_host from; int from_stat; /* * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog() * require only two arguments. */ #ifdef LOG_MAIL (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY); #else (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID); #endif /* * Find out and verify the remote host name. Sites concerned with * security may choose to refuse connections from hosts that pretend to * have someone elses host name. */ from_stat = fromhost(&from); #ifdef PARANOID if (from_stat == -1) refuse(&from); #endif /* * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in * the access-control tables. */ #ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS if (!hosts_access(argv[0], from.source)) refuse(&from); #endif /* Report remote host name and invoke the real daemon program. */ syslog(LOG_INFO, "connect from %s", from.source); (void) execv(REAL_DAEMON, argv); syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", REAL_DAEMON); return (1); }