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Network Working Group B. Kaliski
INTERNET-DRAFT RSA Data Security, Inc.
1 July 1991
Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part IV: Notary, Co-Issuer, CRL-Storing and CRL-Retrieving Services
STATUS OF THIS MEMO
This draft document will be submitted to the RFC editor as a protocol
specification. Comments should be sent to <pem-dev@tis.com> or to the
author. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This document is the product of many discussions at RSA Data
Security, Inc., at Trusted Information Systems, Inc., and on the
<pem-dev@tis.com> mailing list. Contributors include Dave Balenson,
Jim Bidzos, Pat Cain, Vint Cerf, Pam Cochrane, Steve Dusse, Jeff
Fassett, Craig Finseth, Jim Galvin, Mike Indovina, Bob Jueneman,
Steve Kent, John Lowry, Paul McKenney, Jeff Thompson, Charles Wu, and
several others.
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary 1
2. Terminology 2
3. Overview 3
4. Notary Service -- pem-notary 4
5. Co-Issuer Service -- pem-co-issuer 7
6. CRL-Storing Service -- pem-crl-archive 11
7. CRL-Retrieving Service -- pem-crl-server 12
8. Other Services -- pem-info and pem-bug-report 14
9. Areas for Further Study 14
10. Security Considerations 14
References 14
Author's Address 15
APPENDIX - Top-Level Certification Authorities 16
1. Executive Summary
This document describes four services that top-level certification
authorities (TLCAs) may provide in support of Internet Privacy-
Enhanced Mail [1-3]: notary certificate-signing services, co-issuer
certificate-signing and certificate revocation list (CRL)-signing
services, CRL-storing services, and CRL-retrieving services. The
Kaliski [Page 1]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
document specifies the forms for interacting by electronic mail with
TLCAs providing those services. It is intended as a reference for
TLCAs and for implementors of privacy-enhanced mail software; it is
not at the appropriate level for users, except for the CRL-retrieving
service. The document also lists TLCAs.
Certificate-signing services are provided on behalf of organizations
registered with a TLCA and for users not affiliated with registered
organizations; CRL-signing services are provided on behalf of
registered organizations. CRL-storing and CRL-retrieving services are
provided for all users. Registration of organizations, designation of
organizational notaries for Privacy-Enhanced Mail, and the paper
forms submitted in conjunction with electronic forms are outside the
scope of this document. Nevertheless, such information should be
available from TLCAs through the information service.
This Internet draft is proposed as a successor to the RFC
1113/1114/1115 Privacy-Enhanced Mail suite, describing procedures
required by the other proposed successors to those RFCs [4-6]. It is
expected that if this document and other proposed successors are
accepted as RFCs, then references in this document to the proposed
successors would be replaced by references to the new RFCs. This
document may be referred to as Internet draft [FORMS-C].
2. Terminology
Most terms in this document, such as certificate, CRL, and privacy-
enhanced message, are defined in the proposed successors to RFCs
1113, 1114 and 1115 [4-6].
2.1 Prototype Certificate
A prototype certificate has the same syntax as a certificate
(assuming the syntax given in the proposed successor to RFC 1114 [5])
but the following differences in semantics:
1. The outer algorithm identifier (the one in the SIGNED
macro) identifies a hash algorithm. The hash algorithm
can be based on the issuer's signature algorithm, but it
need not be. For example, if the issuer's signature
algorithm is "rsaWithMD2" then the issuer's hash
algorithm can be "md2," but it need not be "md2."
2. The signature (the one in the SIGNED macro) is the hash
of the "to-be-signed" field under the outer hash
algorithm.
Kaliski [Page 2]\f
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2.2 Prototype CRL
A prototype CRL has the same syntax as a CRL (assuming the syntax
given in the proposed successor to RFC 1114 [5]) with the differences
in semantics outlined for prototype certificates.
2.3 Prototype Privacy-Enhanced Message
A prototype privacy-enhanced message is a privacy-enhanced message
(assuming the syntax given in the proposed successor to RFC 1113 [4])
that contains a prototype certificate or a prototype CRL where a
"real" certificate or CRL would go. To be precise, a prototype
privacy-enhanced message can have the MIC-CLEAR, MIC-ONLY, or CRL
process type, as follows:
MIC-CLEAR or MIC-ONLY: For these process types, the privacy-
enhanced message should employ asymmetric cryptography;
the message-integrity check (MIC) algorithm should be
keyless (e.g., RSA-MD2, not MAC) so that the signature on
that message can be verified by anyone; and there should
be only one originator. The originator's "Certificate:"
field should contain the prototype certificate, and there
should not be any issuer certificates.
CRL: For this process type, there should be one or more "CRL:"
fields containing prototype CRLs. There should not be any
certificates or issuer certificates.
A prototype privacy-enhanced message is almost "real," in the sense
that once the prototype certificate or CRLs it contains are signed,
the privacy-enhanced message can be processed in the ordinary way.
3. Overview
The key management infrastructure defined in the proposed successor
to RFC 1114 [5] in support of Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail implies
that TLCAs support some of the following services:
1. Notary service, or certificate-signing service on behalf
of users. The TLCA issues a certificate to a user under
the TLCA's NOTARY organizational unit.
2. Co-issuer service, or certificate- and CRL-signing
services on behalf of organizations. The TLCA holds an
organization's private key and issues a certificate or a
CRL on behalf of the organization, as requested by an
organizational notary.
3. CRL-storing and CRL-retrieving services. The TLCA stores
and retrieves CRLs.
Kaliski [Page 3]\f
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A TLCA may choose to support the first service or the second service
or both. A TLCA must support the third service as well as bug-report
and information services. Support of the third service must cover at
least those CRLs signed by the TLCA and by organizations to which the
TLCA issues certificates.
This document gives details on how TLCAs should implement these
services. All the services are based on electronic mail, although
TLCAs may require paper forms in addition. Six electronic-mail
addresses are defined:
pem-notary: for the notary service
pem-co-issuer: for the co-issuer service
pem-crl-archive: for the CRL-storing service
pem-crl-server: for the CRL-retrieving service
pem-bug-report: for bug reports
pem-info: for information
Replies to service requests are sent to the address identified in the
"Reply-To:" field of the request, and if that field is omitted, to
the address identified in the "From:" field.
4. Notary Service -- pem-notary
The notary service (electronic-mail address "pem-notary") signs
certificates on behalf of users not affiliated with registered
organizations. Notary service can be requested by any user. Such
users are issued certificates under the TLCA's NOTARY organizational
unit, in accordance with the proposed successor to RFC 1114 [5].
The total process of accessing the notary service can be viewed in
three parts: request preparation, request processing, and reply
processing. This section describes those three parts, then gives
examples.
4.1 Request Preparation
A user prepares a request for notary service by constructing a
prototype MIC-CLEAR or MIC-ONLY privacy-enhanced message with the
user as originator, where the privacy-enhanced message contains a
prototype certificate that the user wants the notary service to sign.
There are three substeps to this step:
Kaliski [Page 4]\f
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1. The user constructs a prototype certificate containing
the user's distinguished name, the user's public key and
prototype (not necessarily final) information in the
other certificate fields. Here the issuer should be the
TLCA's NOTARY organizational unit. This step can be done
when the user generates a public-key/private-key pair, or
at a later time.
2. The user prepares a prototype MIC-CLEAR or MIC-ONLY
privacy-enhanced message containing the prototype
certificate, some text, and the user's signature (with
the user's newly generated private key) on the text. Some
TLCAs may specify what the text of the message should be;
in general, it should be something innocuous but user-
specific like "This is a certificate for <name>."
3. The user sends the result of step 2 to the notary
service.
The notary service may require that the user accompany a request with
a paper form or contract, and may require notarization of the form or
contract by a notary public or other trusted entity. Such procedures
are outside the scope of this document, but should be available
through the TLCA's information service.
4.2 Request Processing
The notary service processes a request by replacing the prototype
certificate in the request with a signed version, and adding some
certificates. Thus the result of processing is an "ordinary" privacy-
enhanced message with the user as originator.
There are four substeps to this step:
1. The notary service checks the user's signature on the
text of the message. If the signature check is
unsuccessful, processing stops.
2. The notary service gives final values to fields of the
prototype certificate such as serial number, issuer name,
and validity period. The notary service does not change
the user's name or the user's public key, however.
3. The notary service signs the revised prototype
certificate with the NOTARY organizational unit's private
key and replaces the prototype certificate in the user's
prototype privacy-enhanced message with the newly signed
certificate. The notary service also adds the NOTARY
unit's certificate to the message, and possibly some
pairs of cross-certificates to expand the audience that
can process the resulting message.
Kaliski [Page 5]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
4. The notary service sends the result of step 3 to the user
(or other party as indicated by the "Reply-To:" address).
A separate error report, when necessary, is also sent to
this address.
The notary service may also send a paper reply to the user.
4.3 Reply Processing
The recipient of the reply (typically the user) processes the reply
like any other privacy-enhanced message, which results in the newly
signed certificate and the other certifi-cates being inserted into
the recipient's database. The recipient can subsequently send the
reply to other users as a means of disseminating the new certificate.
4.4 Examples
Following are an example request to the notary service, and an
example reply. Notice that the user's Originator-ID: field in both
the request and the reply omits the issuer name and serial number
subfields, since the values of those subfields are implied by the
prototype certificate or certificate. Those subfields can be included
or omitted, as the proposed successor to RFC 1113 [4] allows.
To: pem-notary@tlca.domain
From: user@host.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: user@host.domain::
Certificate: <user's prototype certificate>
MIC-Info: <user's signature on text>
<text>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 1. Example request to notary service to sign a certificate.
Kaliski [Page 6]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
To: user@host.domain
From: pem-notary@tlca.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: user@host.domain::
Certificate: <user's newly signed certificate>
Issuer-Certificate: <NOTARY organizational unit's certificate>
MIC-Info: <user's signature on text>
<text>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 2. Example reply from notary service including a newly signed
certificate.
5. Co-Issuer Service -- pem-co-issuer
The co-issuer service (electronic-mail address "pem-co-issuer") signs
certificates and CRLs on behalf of registered organizations whose
private key the TLCA holds. Co-issuer service can be requested by any
organizational notary authorized by the TLCA.
A given organizational notary may be authorized to request co-issuer
service for more than one organization, and more than one
organizational notary may be authorized to request service for a
given organization. The association of organizational notaries with
organizations, and how a TLCA manages organizational notaries'
authorization, is outside the scope of this document.
The total process of accessing the co-issuer service can be viewed in
three parts: request preparation, request processing, and reply
processing. This section describes those three parts, then gives
examples.
Note. To avoid ambiguity, we note that an organizational notary is an
individual in an organization authorized by that organization and the
TLCA to request co-issuer service. The organizational notary is
distinct from the TLCA's NOTARY unit.
5.1 Request Preparation
An organizational notary prepares a request for co-issuer service by
constructing a MIC-CLEAR or MIC-ONLY privacy-enhanced message with
the organizational notary as originator, where the text of the
privacy-enhanced message contains one or more prototype privacy-
enhanced messages. Each prototype privacy-enhanced message contains a
prototype certificate or one or more prototype CRLs that the
organizational notary wants signed.
Kaliski [Page 7]\f
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There are three substeps to this step:
1. The organizational notary constructs, or otherwise
obtains, one or more prototype privacy-enhanced messages
containing prototype certificates and prototype CRLs that
are to be signed. Here the prototype certificates and
CRLs specify as issuer a registered organization on whose
behalf the organizational notary is authorized to request
co-issuer service.
It is intended that a prototype privacy-enhanced message
containing a prototype certificate follow the same
conventions as one a user sends to the notary service
(Section 4.1). A user's steps, consequently, are
essentially the same whether the user is affiliated with
a registered organization or not. The primary difference,
however, is that the co-issuer service does not change
any fields of the prototype certificate, whereas the
notary service may. Thus the organizational notary must
give final values to fields of the user's prototype
certificate. Similarly, the organizational notary must
give final values to fields of a prototype CRL.
2. The organizational notary "notarizes" the prototype
privacy-enhanced messages by encapsulating them in a MIC-
CLEAR or MIC-ONLY privacy-enhanced message, with the
organizational notary as originator.
3. The organizational notary sends the result of step 2 to
the co-issuer service.
5.2 Request Processing
The co-issuer service processes a request by replacing the prototype
certificates and CRLs in the request with signed versions, and adding
some certificates. The result of processing is one or more privacy-
enhanced messages, "back to back."
There are four substeps to this step:
1. The co-issuer service checks the organizational notary's
signature on the prototype privacy-enhanced message. If
the signature check is unsuccessful, processing stops.
2. For each prototype private-enhanced message, the co-
issuer service does the following:
a. If the prototype privacy-enhanced message contains a
prototype certificate, the co-issuer service checks
the user's signature on the text of the message. If
Kaliski [Page 8]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
the signature check is unsuccessful, processing of
the particular privacy-enhanced message stops.
b. The co-issuer service signs the prototype
certificate or CRLs contained in the privacy-
enhanced message with the appropriate issuer's
private key and replaces the prototype certificate
or CRLs in the prototype privacy-enhanced messages
with the newly signed certificate or CRLs. The
notary service also adds the organization's
certificate to the messages, and possibly some pairs
of cross-certificates to expand the audience that
can process the resulting message.
The co-issuer service does not change any fields of
a prototype certificate or CRL before signing it.
The co-issuer service either signs a prototype
certificate or CRL verbatim, or, if any values are
erroneous, rejects the particular certificate or
CRL.
3. The co-issuer service sends the result of step 2 to the
organizational notary (or other party as indicated by
"Reply-To:" address.) A separate error report, when
necessary, is also sent to this address.
4. The co-issuer service sends newly signed CRLs resulting
from step 2 to the CRL-storing service described in
Section 6.)
5.3 Reply Processing
The recipient of the reply (typically the organizational notary)
processes the reply like any other set of "back to back" privacy-
enhanced messages, which results in the newly signed certificates and
CRLs being inserted into the recipient's database. The recipient can
subsequently send the reply to other users as a means of
disseminating the new certificates and CRLs.
5.4 Examples
Following are example requests to the co-issuer service (one to sign
a certificate, the other to sign a CRL), and example replies. Notice
that the user's Originator-ID: field encapsulated in the request and
the reply omits the issuer name and serial number subfields, as in
Section 4.4. The organizational notary's Originator-ID: field, on the
other hand, includes both subfields, since the organizational notary
does not include a certificate. The subfields can be included or
omitted, as the proposed successor to RFC 1113 [4] allows.
Kaliski [Page 9]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
To: pem-co-issuer@tlca.domain
From: organizational-notary@host.domain
Reply-To: user@host.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: organizational-notary@host.domain:
<organization's name>:<serial number>
MIC-Info: <organizational notary's signature on prototype message>
- -----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: user@host.domain::
Certificate: <user's prototype certificate>
MIC-Info: <user's signature on text>
<text>
- -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED-MESSAGE-----
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 3. Example request to co-issuer service to sign a certificate.
To: user@host.domain
From: pem-co-issuer@tlca.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: user@host.domain::
Certificate: <user's newly signed certificate>
Issuer-Certificate: <organization's certificate>
MIC-Info: <user's signature on text>
<text>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 4. Example reply from co-issuer service, including a newly signed
certificate.
Kaliski [Page 10]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
To: pem-co-issuer@tlca.domain
From: organizational-notary@host.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-ID: organizational-notary@host.domain:
<organization's name>:<serial number>
MIC-Info: <organizational notary's signature on prototype message>
- -----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <prototype CRL>
- -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 5. Example request to co-issuer service to sign a CRL.
To: organizational-notary@host.domain
Cc: pem-crl-archive@tlca.domain
From: pem-co-issuer@tlca.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <newly signed CRL>
Certificate: <organization's certificate>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 6. Example reply from co-issuer service, including a newly signed
CRL.
6. CRL-Storing Service -- pem-crl-archive
The CRL-storing service (electronic-mail address "pem-crl-archive")
stores CRLs. CRL-storing service can be requested by any user,
although it is expected that CRL-storing service will be requested
primarily by organizational notaries of organizations for which the
TLCA is not a co-issuer. The co-issuer service automatically sends
newly signed CRLs to the CRL-storing service, so organizational
notaries of organizations for which the TLCA is a co-issuer need not
use the CRL-storing service directly.
The total process of accessing the CRL-storing service can be viewed
in two parts: request preparation and request processing. There is no
significant reply processing, since a reply is just an
acknowledgement. This section describes those two parts, then gives
an example.
Kaliski [Page 11]\f
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6.1 Request Preparation
A user or organizational notary prepares a request for CRL-storing
service by constructing a CRL-type privacy-enhanced message, where
the privacy-enhanced message contains CRLs that the user or
organizational notary wants stored. The user or organizational notary
sends the result to the CRL-storing service.
6.2 Request Processing
The CRL-storing service stores the CRLs in the request, provided they
are valid, and replies with an acknowledgement (or an error report).
6.3 Example
Following is an example request to the CRL-storing service and an
example reply.
To: pem-crl-archive@tlca.domain
From: organizational-notary@host.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <CRL to be stored>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 7. Example request to CRL-storing service to store a CRL.
To: organizational-notary@host.domain
From: pem-crl-archive@tlca.domain
Your request to store a CRL for
organizationalUnitName=Widgets Division, XYZ Inc., US
has been processed successfully.
Figure 8. Example reply from CRL-storing service.
7. CRL-Retrieving Service -- pem-crl-server
The CRL-retrieving service (electronic-mail address "pem-crl-server")
retrieves CRLs. CRL-retrieving service can be requested by any user.
A side-effect of this service is that current cross-certificate
pairs, and relevant current CRLs other than those requested, are made
available.
Kaliski [Page 12]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
The total process of accessing the CRL-retrieving service can be
viewed in three parts: request preparation, request processing, and
reply processing. This section describes those three parts, then
gives examples.
7.1 Request Preparation
A user prepares a request for CRL-retrieving service by constructing
a message that contains distinguished names of one or more issuers,
separated by blank lines. The names are represented according to the
User-Friendly Name syntax [7]. The names identify the issuers whose
latest CRLs the user wants.
7.2 Request Processing
The CRL-retrieving service processes a request by replacing the
issuer distinguished names in the request with the latest CRLs for
the issuers, and adding some certificates. The result of processing
is a CRL-type privacy-enhanced message containing one or more CRLs.
The CRL-retrieving service also adds the requested issuers'
certificates, possibly some pairs of cross-certificates, and other
relevant CRLs to expand the audience that can process the resulting
message.
The CRL-retrieving service sends a separate error report if
necessary.
7.3 Reply Processing
The recipient of the reply processes the reply like any other CRL-
type privacy-enhanced message, which results in the CRLs being
inserted into the recipient's database. The recipient can
subsequently send the reply to other users as a means of
disseminating the CRLs.
7.4 Examples
Following are an example request and an example reply. The request is
for the latest CRLs issued by RSA Data Security, Inc.'s TLCA and
NOTARY organizational units.
Kaliski [Page 13]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
To: pem-crl-server@tlca.domain
From: user@host.domain
organizationalUnitName=TLCA, "RSA Data Security, Inc.", US
organizationalUnitName=NOTARY, "RSA Data Security, Inc.", US
Figure 9. Example request to CRL-retrieving service to retrieve two
CRLs.
To: user@host.domain
From: pem-crl-server@tlca.domain
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <latest CRL issued by RSA Data Security, Inc.'s TLCA unit>
CRL: <latest CRL issued by RSA Data Security, Inc.'s NOTARY unit>
Certificate: <RSA Data Security, Inc.'s NOTARY unit's certificate>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 10. Example reply from CRL-retrieving service, including two
CRLs.
8. Other Services -- pem-info and pem-bug-report
The information service (electronic-mail address: pem-info) provides
information about the TLCA's services, and the bug-report service
(electronic-mail address: pem-bug-report) receives reports on bugs in
the services.
9. Areas for Further Study
One important area for further study is what services are needed for
certifying organizations for which the TLCA is not a co-issuer (in
particular, other TLCAs).
10. Security Considerations
Some of the services described in this memo rely on the security of
Privacy-Enhanced Mail. In particular, the co-issuer service relies on
the trustworthiness of Privacy-Enhanced Mail purportedly signed by an
organizational notary.
References
[1] Linn, J., Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I -- Message Encipherment and Authentication
Procedures (RFC 1113), August 1989.
Kaliski [Page 14]\f
INTERNET-DRAFT Mail Privacy: Services 1 July 1991
[2] Kent, S., and J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet
Electronic Mail: Part II -- Certificate-Based Key
Management (RFC 1114), August 1989.
[3] Linn, J., Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part III -- Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers (RFC
1115), August 1989.
[4] Linn, J., Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Procedures (Internet Draft), March 1991.
[5] Kent, S., Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management
(unofficially, RFC [1114B]), February 1991.
[6] Balenson, D., Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers
(unofficially, RFC [1115B]), February 1991.
[7] Kille, S.E., Using the OSI Directory to Achieve User
Friendly Naming (Internet Draft), January 1991.
Author's Address
Burton S. Kaliski Jr.
RSA Data Security, Inc.
10 Twin Dolphin Drive
Redwood City, CA 94065
Phone: (415) 595-8782
FAX: (415) 595-1873
EMail: kaliski@rsa.com
Kaliski [Page 15]\f
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APPENDIX - Top-Level Certification Authorities
This appendix lists TLCAs providing services described in this
document.
A.1 RSA Data Security, Inc.
RSA Data Security, Inc. provides all six services described in this
document ("pem-notary," "pem-co-issuer," "pem-crl-archive," "pem-crl-
server," "pem-info," and "pem-bug-report") at the host "rsa.com." For
more information, including organizational contracts and paper re-
quest forms, write or call:
RSA Data Security, Inc.
10 Twin Dolphin Drive
Redwood City, CA 94065
Phone: (415) 595-8782
FAX: (415) 595-1873
EMail: pem-info@rsa.com
RSA Data Security, Inc. has both TLCA and NOTARY organizational
units. They are:
organizationalUnitName=TLCA, "RSA Data Security, Inc.", US
and
organizationalUnitName=NOTARY, "RSA Data Security, Inc.", US
Their public keys, respectively, are:
(to be supplied)
and
(to be supplied)
As of this writing, these services are NOT YET ACTIVE.
Kaliski [Page 16]\f