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DKUUG/EUUG Conference tapes

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Index: T s

⟦a7a1fe6a8⟧ TextFile

    Length: 4240 (0x1090)
    Types: TextFile
    Names: »suid.chk«

Derivation

└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen
    └─⟦3da311d67⟧ »./cops/1.04/cops_104.tar.Z« 
        └─⟦6a2577110⟧ 
└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen
    └─⟦6a2577110⟧ »./cops/1.04/cops_104.tar« 
            └─⟦this⟧ »cops_104/perl/suid.chk« 

TextFile

#!/bin/sh -- need to mention perl here to avoid recursion
'true' || eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q';
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
& eval 'exec /usr/local/bin/perl -S $0 $argv:q'
        if 0;

#
#  Usage: suid.chk [-n] [-s secure_dir] [search_starting_directory]
#
#   Shell script intended to be run periodically by cron in order
#   to spot changes in files with the suid or sgid bits set.
#
#	suid.chk	840919		Prentiss Riddle
#
#     This changes into the $SECURE directory first, then 
#   uses find(1) to search the directories in $SEARCH for all
#   files with the 4000 or 2000 permission bits set.  $STOP is a file
#   containing "ls -gildsa" output for known setuid or setgid programs.
#   Any additions or changes to this list represent potential security
#   problems, so they are reported.
#
#  Modified 8/15/89, Dan Farmer:
#	Just changed the program/doc names and some of the temp
#  files to make it fit in with the rest of the programs....
#  Modified 12/26/90, df
#       Now flags SUID shell scripts and world writeable SUID files, too.
#
#  Rewritten in perl, 1/17/91, df
#  Major hacks by tchrist 5/14/91
#

require "hostname.pl";
require "is_able.pl";
require "file_owner.pl";
require "pathconf.pl";
require "chk_strings.pl";
require "pass.cache.pl";
package suid_chk; # name space protection
$debug=0;

#
# Getopts stuff
$usage = "Usage: $0 [-n] [-s secure_dir] [starting_directory]\n";
require 'getopts.pl';
# Process the command args; Either specify verbose or an alternate config file:
die $usage unless &'Getopts('ns:');

$suid_dir = $'SECURE || '.';
if (defined($'opt_s)) { $suid_dir = $'opt_s; }

# Do NFS stuff?  Yes unless opt:
if (defined($'opt_n)) { $skip_nfs = 1; }
else { $skip_nfs = 0; }

$STOP="$suid_dir/suid.stop" unless defined $STOP;
$FINDARGS="" unless defined $FINDARGS;
$LSARGS=" -glids" unless defined $LSARGS;

$TEMPOLD="$suid_dir/fsold$$";
$TEMPCUR="$suid_dir/fscur$$";
$TEMPNEW="$suid_dir/fsnew$$";
$TEMPGON="$suid_dir/fsgon$$";
$TEMPM="$suid_dir/fsm$$";

if (@ARGV > 1) { die $usage; }
elsif (@ARGV == 1) { $start_dir = shift; }

# these may be terribly rash assumptions....
$start_dir="/" unless defined $start_dir;
$find_can_ls = 1 unless defined $find_can_ls;

$NONFS = '-type d \( -fstype nfs -prune \) -o' if $skip_nfs;  
$find_ls = $find_can_ls ? '-ls' : "-exec $'LS $LSARGS {} \\;";

die "Error -- Security directory $suid_dir doesn't exist\n"
    unless -d $suid_dir;
unless (-d $suid_dir) {
    mkdir($suid_dir, 0700) || die "can't mkdir $suid_dir: $!";
} 
chdir $suid_dir || die "can't chdir $suid_dir: $!\n";

# find the setuid programs and sort
&run("$'FIND $start_dir $FINDARGS $NONFS -type f \\( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \\) $find_ls | $'SORT > $TEMPCUR");

# compare with the sorted stop list
# create stop file if needed
if (! -f $STOP) { open(S,">$STOP"); close(S); }

&run("$'SORT <$STOP >$TEMPOLD");
&run("$'COMM -13 $TEMPOLD $TEMPCUR | $'SORT +8 >$TEMPNEW");
&run("$'COMM -23 $TEMPOLD $TEMPCUR | $'SORT +8 >$TEMPGON");

local($is_able'silent) = 1;
local($chk_strings'recurse) = 0 unless defined $chk_strings'recurse;

# report changes
if (-s $TEMPNEW || -s $TEMPGON) {
    if (-s $TEMPNEW) {
	open TEMPNEW || die "Can't open $TEMPNEW: $!\n";
	while (<TEMPNEW>) {
	    ($file) = /(\S+)$/;

	    # don't want SUID files to be world writable!
	    # although *reasonable* systems clear the bit on write
	    print "Warning!  SUID file $file is _World_ writable!\n" 
		if &'is_able ($file, "w", "w"); 
		    
	    if (-r $file && -f _ && -T $file) {
		print "Warning!  ", &'Owner($file) ? '' : 'ROOT-owned ', 
		    "SUID file $file is a non-binary, executable file!\n";
	    }

	    &'chk_strings($file) if -r _;
	}
	close TEMPNEW;
    }

    if (-s $TEMPNEW) {
	open TEMPNEW || die "Can't reopen $TEMPNEW: $!\n";
	print "\nThese files are newly setuid/setgid:\n\n";
	print while <TEMPNEW>;
    }

    if (-s $TEMPGON) {
	open TEMPGON || die "Can't reopen $TEMPGON: $!\n";
	print "\nThese files are no longer setuid/setgid:\n\n";
	print while <TEMPGON>;
    }

}

unlink $TEMPOLD, $TEMPCUR, $TEMPNEW, $TEMPGON;

sub run {
    print "running: $_[0]\n" if $debug;
    system $_[0];
    warn "command $_[0] returned $?" if $?;
} 

#  end it all....

1;