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Length: 2427 (0x97b)
Types: TextFile
Names: »miscd.c«
└─⟦4f9d7c866⟧ Bits:30007245 EUUGD6: Sikkerheds distributionen
└─⟦62b59102f⟧ »./log_tcp/3.1.tar.Z«
└─⟦1de3ed35f⟧
└─⟦this⟧ »log_tcp/miscd.c«
/*
* Front end to the ULTRIX miscd service. The front end logs the remote host
* name and then invokes the real miscd daemon. Install as "/usr/etc/miscd",
* after moving the real miscd daemon to the "/usr/etc/..." directory.
* Connections and diagnostics are logged through syslog(3).
*
* The Ultrix miscd program implements (among others) the systat service, which
* pipes the output from who(1) to stdout. This information is potentially
* useful to systems crackers.
*
* Compile with -DHOSTS_ACCESS in order to enable access control. See the
* hosts_access(5) manual page for details.
*
* Compile with -DPARANOID if service should be refused to hosts that pretend
* to have someone elses host name. This gives some protection against rsh
* and rlogin attacks that involve compromised domain name servers.
*
* Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
*/
#ifndef lint
static char sccsid[] = "@(#) miscd.c 1.2 91/10/02 23:01:43";
#endif
/* System libraries. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <syslog.h>
/* Local stuff. */
#include "log_tcp.h"
/* The following specifies where the vendor-provided daemon should go. */
#define REAL_DAEMON "/usr/etc/.../miscd"
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
struct from_host from;
int from_stat;
/*
* Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog()
* require only two arguments.
*/
#ifdef LOG_MAIL
(void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY);
#else
(void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID);
#endif
/*
* Find out and verify the remote host name. Sites concerned with
* security may choose to refuse connections from hosts that pretend to
* have someone elses host name.
*/
from_stat = fromhost(&from);
#ifdef PARANOID
if (from_stat == -1)
refuse(&from);
#endif
/*
* Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The
* access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in
* the access-control tables.
*/
#ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS
if (!hosts_access(argv[0], from.source))
refuse(&from);
#endif
/* Report remote host name and invoke the real daemon program. */
syslog(LOG_INFO, "connect from %s", from.source);
(void) execv(REAL_DAEMON, argv);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", REAL_DAEMON);
return (1);
}